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Tax Problems of Revocable Trusts
By BYRON E. BRONSTON
SECOND VICE-PRESIDENT, TRUST DEPARTMENT,
CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY . . . CHAIRMAN, SECTION ON FEDERAL
TAXATION LAW, ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
Y OUR CONCEPT of a revocable trustbefore you became more expert in the
field of taxes was, I dare say, that such a
trust was in the nature of a glorified agency
-a sort of Gorgeous Gussie, fancy-pants
arrangement. How disarming can be our
thinking prior to the time when the full
bloom of understanding comes to us!
For income, gift and estate tax purposes,
the term "trust" has a varied meaning. A
trust must, of course, comprise property.
It must be something with sufficient objec-
tive existence to permit the concept of one
person holding title to it while, at the same
time, another person owns a beneficial in-
terest in it.
Whether or not the trust is revocable or ir-
revocable is a question to be determined only
by the weighing and analyzing of a host of
factors, many of which will be peculiar to the
particular situation at hand. The taxation of
gifts in trust is dependent upon the factors
which determine the extent of the donor's
relinquishment of the property. Among
these factors are the powers of revestment
and amendment. For gift tax, estate tax
and income tax purposes, however, the tests
do not necessarily coincide. Our discussion
will be confined to various facets of the
problems surrounding revocable trusts.
A revocable trust is generally treated for
income tax purposes as if no trust existed
at all. It is sufficient that the language of
the trust be construed to mean that the
trust is revocable in practical effect, though
technically it may not be. If the grantor
retains by some action on his part or by an
action which he can exercise in conjunc-
tion with another person, whose interests
are not substantially adverse to the taking
of such action, the power to get the res
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back, he has created a revocable trust with-
in the definition of Code Section 166. It
is interesting, perhaps, to note that Sen-
ate Finance Committee -Report. No. 396,
Sixty-eighth Congress, describes a revo-
cable trust as the creation of a trust con-
stituting nothing but an assignment of the
right to receive future income. Even though
the grantor expressly provides that the
trust shall be irrevocable, the retention by
him of certain rights and powers may
amount to the substantial equivalent of a
power to revest. The determining factor
is the intent of the grantor, which must be
gathered from an analysis of the trust in-
strument in its entirety and from circum-.
stances attendant upon its creation. The
test of the applicability of Secton 166 is the
existence of a power rather than its exer-
cise. The controlling factor is not what the
grantor does, but what he can do. Since a
revocable trust is taxed to the grantor as if
the trust did not exist, it follows that the
loss of the trust corpus is a loss of the
grantor which may be deducted on his
individual return.
Control over Corpus
Rather Than Income
Section 166 relates to those powers which
are connected with control over the corpus
of the trust rather than over its income.
Where the present right to reacquire the
property rests in the grantor's sole discre-
tion, he is taxable upon the trust income.
The creation of the trust is not taxable as a
gift, and the trust corpus is includible in
his estate.
The grantor named in the instrument may
be grantor in name only, the real grantor,
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who furnished the property or consideration
leading to the creation of the trust, not, ap-
pearing as such in the formal wording of
the instrument. The test applicable to a
determination of who is the real grantor is
the same for both income and estate tax
purposes, namely, the ascertainment of who
furnished the consideration for the creation
of the trust. On the negative side of this
rule, the following recent case is of interest:
Alice G. Preston Estate, CCH Dec. 17,772,
14 TC -, No. 158. The decedent's brother-
in-law had set up a trust for the decedent,
the income to be paid to her for life. The
grantor gave the trustee a check for $125,000,
the only asset of the trust. On the following
day, the trustee loaned the grantor $125,000,
for which he gave the trustee his note or
personal bond agreeing to repay within a
time certain with interest. The trust instru-
ment gave the trustee the power to lend to
the grantor. The decedent died intestate.
No income tax returns had been filed by
or for her for four years prior to her death.
The administratrix filed the returns but did
not include the income from the trust. The
Commissioner determined deficiencies for
the years in question. The petitioner claimed
that the trust was revocable and that under
Section 166, the income was not taxable to
the decedent but to the grantor. The
court, however, upheld the Commissioner,
taxing the income to the decedent.
Adverse Interest
I have summarized the general rules ap-
plicable to various types of reserved powers.
If the grantor's power to reacquire the
trust corpus is exercisable in conjunction
with another person, it is important to de-
termine whether the latter has a "substantial
adverse interest." If he has not, the income,
estate and gift tax consequences are the
same as though the grantor could 6xercise
such power alone-he is taxable upon the
trust income under Section 166, the trust
corpus is includible in his estate and no gift
tax is incurred. Where the power is exercis-
able only with an adverse interest, the gran-
tor avoids income tax on the trust income, but
the trust corpus in nonetheless includible in
his estate under Code Section 811(d). Prob-
ably the creation of such a trust also consti-
tutes a taxable gift. A recent example is that
of a decedent grantor who established a trust
on December 3, 1936, under the terms of which
the income of seven ninths of the trust estate
was payable to his wife for life and, after
her death, payable to the grantor for life.
The trust was irrevocable but could be revoked
or terminated by the written consent of "all
of the then living beneficiaries" twenty-one
years or more of age. The Commissioner held
the value of the trust estate includible in
the gross estate of the decedent under Sec-
tion 811(d)(1). The court found that the
grantor was a beneficiary and that under
the trust agreement, he actually had the
power, in conjunction with other benefici-
aries of the same class, to revoke or termi-
nate the trust. Estate of A. Frank Seltzer
v. Commissioner, 49-1 usTC 10,719 (CA-6),
aff'g CCH Dec. 16,408, 10 TC 810 (1948).
Let us assume that the grantor's reacqui-
sition of the trust corpus is dependent upon
the exercise of another's discretion (where
the grantor is not required to join in the
exercise of the power). Here, the adverse
or nonadverse character of the other per-
son's interest is again important. If that
person is not adverse to the grantor, the
grantor remains taxable on the trust income,
and the creation of the trust is probably not
a taxable gift. Note, however, that in this
case,, the trust corpus appears not to be in-
cludible in the grantor's estate for estate
tax purposes. If the other person has an
adverse interest, the grantor avoids both in-
come tax and estate tax and is probably subject
to gift tax upon the creation of the trust.
Where a person has a "substantial adverse
interest" in the corpus of the trust or in the
income from it and if his consent is required
before the grantor may reacquire the trust
property, the grantor is not taxable upon
the trust income. The courts have held
that a life beneficiary or a vested remainder-
man is clearly adverse with respect to the
portion of the trust from which his interest
is derived. There are, however, many border-
line situations in which the beneficiary's
interest is contingent or is, in turn, depend -
ent upon another's discretion. Generally
speaking, a person has no adverse interest
merely because he has a natural incentive
to preserve the interest of the present bene-
ficiaries. It has been held that even a bene-
ficiary may not be "adverse" where he is
closely related to the creator. The fiduciary
relationship of a trustee does not constitute
an adverse interest, and his right to com-
missions does not make his adverse interest
substantial. In Cohen, CCH Dec. 17,845, 15
TC -, No. 40 (1950), the taxpayer as the
settlor trustee of a trust, the life benefici-
aries of which were his wife and daughter,
was not taxable on the net income of the
trust, since he did not retain control over
the properties transferred. He had no power
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to revoke the trust, alter or amend its terms,
avail himself of the income or change the
Leneficiaries. The fact that he had broad
power of management over the trust income
and limited discretion over the distributing
or withholding of trust income to the bene-
ficiaries was not decisive, since the trust in-
denture was specific as to his duties and
a court of equity could protect the benefici-
aries' rights.
Powers Equivalent to Revestment
With respect.to powers equivalent to re-
vestment, for estate tax purposes, the trust
corpus may be taxable even though the
grantor's powers of amendment fall short
of the power of revestment but the power
to revest is ordinarily required in order to
subject the grantor to income tax. In
Percy M. Chandler v. Commissioner, 41-1 usTc
9394, 119 F. (2d) 623 (CCA-3), the grantor
set up a trust with his wife as beneficiary.
Under the agreement, the grantor reserved
to himself the right to sell to or buy from
the trust estate at his own price and to
direct the disposition to himself of all or
any of the trust fund for such consideration
and upon such terms as he might direct.
The court held that the income was taxable
to the grantor, his reservation of power be-
ing equivalent to the right to revoke the
trust. The court stated that, in its opinion,
the reservation by the settlor of the power
to deal with the trust assets for his own
benefit was irreconcilable with the funda-
mental principle underlying all fiduciary re-
lationships, that the fiduciary must act solely
in the i4terest of the cestui que trust and,
therefore, may not have personal dealings
with the trust property. As owner of the
assets, the grantor, of course, had' the right
to reserve such a power. His doing so, said
the court, clearly indicated that he did not
intend to impose upon himself fiduciary re-
straints enforceable by the trust beneficiaries.
Even where the grantor's power of re-
vestment does not depend upon the consent
of an adverse party, he may, nevertheless,
avoid income tax where the power is de-
pendent upon a contingency not subject
to his control, but the tax may not be
avoided by the device of making revocation
dependent upon the giving of notice prior
to the taxable year. The trust corpus may
not be subject to estate tax if the power of
revestment was subject to a contingency at
the time of the grantor's death. The tax
may attach, however, where such contingent
power would' have been exercisable by the
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decedent alone or with a nonadverse interest.
In Estate of Paul Loughridge v. Commis-
sioner, 50-1 USTC fr 10,766, 183 F. (2d) 294
(CA-10), cert. den. October 9, 1950, the
decedent's mother transferred property to
him by a deed of gift which contained a re-
quest that decedent make provision for his
children with such portion of the property
as he should determine was proper. The
decedent set up a trust the day after the gift
was received from his mother. He and his
wife were trustees and had the power to
alter, amend or extend all or any of the
terms of the trust. Subsequently, the trust
was amended and the decedent and his wife
resigned as trustees, a bank being named as
successor trustee. Article 12 of the agree-
ment provided that any trustee was to
resign upon written notice from the dece-
dent not less than thirty days after receipt of
such notice and that the decedent might appoint
a successor trustee. The court held that the
decedent must be considered the creator of the
trust and not merely a conduit for the passage
of the property from decedent's mother and
that therefore, the trust property was taxable
on account of the reservation of a power to
terminate and thus shift beneficial interests.
The court further held that at the decedent's
death he was possessed of a power to remove
the trustee of the trust created by him and
appoint himself as successor trustee. Al-
though a thirty-day notice had to be given
to the existing trustee in order to obtain
the trustee's resignation, the right to require
the resignation was held not to be subject
to substantial condlitions. There was, how-
ever, a dissenting opinion filed holding that
since no notice had been given at the time of
the decedent's death to remove the trustee
and appoint a successor, Code Section
811(d)(3) was not applicable.
If the grantor reserves the power to
amend the trust even though he may not
reacquire the corpus himself, the trust is
subject to estate tax. Such powers include
the designation of beneficiaries by will and
the reallocation of beneficiaries' interests dur-
ing the grantor's lifetime. The tax attaches
even though the power is- exercisable only in
conjunction with a person having an adverse
interest. Decedent and his wife, domiciled
in Texas, executed in 1937 and 1938 five
trust agreements for the benefit of their
daughters. Under the terms of each of the
trusts, the decedent had the power at any
time to terminate the trust and deliver the
trust estate to the beneficiary or benefici-
aries then entitled thereto. From 1937 to
1942 inclusive, the grantors transferred cer-
tain community property to such trusts as
gifts. The decedent died in 1942. The
question before the court was whether
the Commissioner erred in including in the
value of the decedent's gross estate the
value of the five trusts as of the date of his
death. The court held for the Commis-
sioner, stating that'a donor who keeps so
strong a hold over the actual and immediate
enjoyment of what he puts beyond his own
power to retake has not divested himself
of that degree of control which Section
811(d) (2) requires in order to avoid the tax.
It is interesting to note that the court also
found, that the value of the wife's one-half
interest in community property originally
transferred and also the value of properties
acquired with trust income were includible
in the decedent's gross estate, since his
power to terminate extended to the entire
estates and the death of the decedent com-
pleted the inter-vivos trusts. Showers, CCH
Dec. 17,651, 14 TC -, No. 111 (1950), citing
Commissioner v. Holmes, 46-1 USTC 1 10,245,
326 U. S. 480.
With further respect to the power to
amend without revestment, the power of
amendment may be one factor in determin-
ing the grantor's liability for income tax as
the 'owner" of the trust property, but the
power of amendment alone does not impose
the tax. Where the grantor's power of
amendment extends to a reapportionment
among beneficiaries, no gift tax is incurred
until the grantor relinquishes such power.
The income from the trust may constitute
a gift when the right to such income vests
in a beneficiary.
Power to Allocate Income
For liability for estate tax because of res-
ervation of the power to allocate income, see
Commissioner v. Hager Estate, 49-1 USTC
10,710, 173 F. (2d) 613, holding that the
grantor retained to himself, as trustee, suffi-
cient alteration or amendment power to
affect very substantially the interests of the
life tenants and the remaindermen, even
though he could not, unless he lost all of the
money of the trust by unfortunate investments,
completely eliminate the remaindermen.
Discretionary Powers
With respect to the reservation of dis-
cretionary powers, see Estate of Mary H.
Hays v. Commissioner, 50-1 UsTC 10,762, 181
F. (2d) 169 (CA-5), in which the grantor-
trustee reserved the right to withhold trust
income from the beneficiary and add it to
the principal. The court held that no ar-
bitrary power to accumulate income was
vested in the trustee but that such power
was discretionary and governed by determi-
nable standards, namely, the best interests
of the beneficiaries and the trust.
Another case of interest is that of the
Estate of Henry J. Mollenberg v. Commis-
sioner, 49-1 uSTc 10,715, 173 F. (2d) 698
(CA-2), aff'g CCH Dec 16,183(M), 6 TCM
1298, involving the transfer of business in-
terests to sons of the grantor, allegedly for
a consideration. The grantor, as trustee,
retained the power to make withdrawals
from the principal of the trust for the bene-
fit of any of the beneficiaries and also to
terminate the trust at any time and pay the
principal to the income beneficiaries. The
court held the trust property includible in
the gross estate of the decedent and pointed
out that the word "sale" means an exchange
resulting from a bargain, one in which the
beneficiary gives or the grantor receives
something of a money value or a binding
promise. In this instance, the grantor paid
a gift tax at the time of the creation of the
trust, and the court found this to be an addi-
tional circumstance indicating that there
had been no sale.
Gain or Loss
The rules of basis for determining gain
or loss with respect to revocable trusts are
set forth in Sections 113(a)(2), 113(a)(3)
and 113(a)(5). Since Section 113(a)(4)
pertains to transfers before January 1, 1921,
for practical purposes we may disregard it.
Section 113(a)(2) provides thal if the
property was acquired by gift after Decem-
ber 31, 1920, the basis shall be the same as it
would be in the hands of the donor or the
last preceding owner by whom it was not
acquired by gift. However, for the purpose
of determining loss, if the adjusted basis is
greater than the fair market value of the
property at the time of the gift, the basis
shall be the fair market value.
The basis under Section 113(a)(3), ap-
plicable likewise to transfers in trust after
December 31, 1920 (other than transfers
in trust by gift, bequests or devise), is the
same as it would be in the hands of the
grantor, increased in the amount of gain or
decreased in the amount of loss recognized
to the grantor, adjusted to the year in which
the transfer was made.
Prior to the 1942 Revenue Act, all trans-
fers in trust, with the exception of those-
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having a basis determined pursuant to Sec-
tion 113(a)(5), were given a basis deter-
mined in accordance with Section 113 (a) (3).
The 1942 Revenue Act provided that trans-
fers in trust by gift during the grantor's
lifetime are to be given a basis in accordance
with Section 113 (a) (2). This, in effect,
overruled Newman, CCH Dec. 14,184, 4 TC
226 (1944), following the purport of the
dissenting opinion in that case. Transfers
in trust other than by gift, bequest or devise
are accorded a basis in accordance with
Section 113(a)(3).
With respect to a trust having a basis
determined either by Section 113 (a) (2) or
113(a)(3), the fact that the trust later is
taxed under Section 811(c) or 811(d) for
federal estate tax purposes has no effect
upon the basis except as hereinafter noted.
The constitutionality of compelling the donee
to use the donor's cost in a case where the
gift was held taxable as made in contempla-
tion of death was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Taft v. Bowers, 1 USTC 368, 278
U. S. 470 (1929).
The exception hereinbefore referred to
arises where a trust is revocable, the grantor
retaining the right to income or the right to
control its disposition, and where the basis
upon the death of the donor is determined
after his death under Section 113 (a)(5).
Such a trust pays an estate tax, and the
basis shifts as of the donor's death to the val-
ue of the trust property either as of the
date of his death or one year thereafter if
optional values are used pursuant to the pro-
visions of Section 811(j). In order for the
basis to shift, it is essential that both of the
requirements of Section 113(a)(5) be met,
namely, that the trust be revocable and that
the grantor retain control over the income.
Since this is an exception to the general rule,
Section 113(a) (5) cases should be narrowly
construed.
If for basis purposes the trust is taxable
under Section 113 (a) (5) after the donor's
death, the holding period of the trustee or of
the beneficiary begins with the date of the
donor's death. This is set forth in GCM
19347 (1938-1CB-218), supported by Dewees,
CCH Dec. 13,048, 1 TC 791 (1943). How-
ever, this interpretation may be subject to
some question in view of the language in
Helvering v. Gambrill, 41-1 usTc 9360, 313
U. S. 11, in which the Supreme-Court states
that the holding period "embraces not only
full ownership but also any interest whether
vested, contingent or conditional." While
the latter case did not involve the ques-
tion of the shifting of basis under Section
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113(a)(5) and the Court's language is dic-
tum, it may be regarded, however, as a
possible direction pointer.
Conversely, it has been decided that the
holding period does not begin until the de-
cedent's death where the property was
transferred by the decedent to a revocable
trust and, therefore, had as its basis the
value at the time of death. Fifth Avenue
Bank v. U. S., 41-2 USTC 9722, 41 F. Supp.
428 (Ct. Cls.), cert. den. 315 U. S. 820
(1942). Where the property was purchased
after death by the fiduciary, the holding
period, of course, begins on the date of such
purchase. It would seem that the hold-
ing period is not affected by the valuation
of the estate for estate tax as of one year
after death.
Where a beneficiary may have received
shares of stock in distribution of a trust
and was also the owner in his own right.of
other shares of stock of the same company,
in the absence of specific identification of
shares sold, the sale of shares acquired at
different times or at different prices is con-
trolled by the "first-in, first-out" presump-
tion. Helvering v. Campbell, 41-1 USTC 9359,
313 U. S. 15.
1950 Revenue Act Problems
I should like to pose a problem which may
arise by reason of the 1950 Revenue Act
amendment covering the treatment of liter-
ary, musical or artistic compositions, etc.
(See Sections 117(a)(1) and 117(j)(1), as
amended.) Let us assume that Smith, a
lawyer, writes a television show. He as-
signs his interest in the show to a trust, re-
serving the right to dispose of the income
and the right to revoke. After his death,
pursuant to the terms of the trust, the in-
come is payable to his son, and his son has the
right to direct the sale of the property in
the trust and to terminate the trust at any
time. May it not be-argued that, after
Smith's death, the proceeds of a sale of the
television show will be subject to the basis
provided in Section 113(a)(5) and will be
treated as a capital asset in the hands of
the son rather than as ordinary income as
is would have been treated if Smith himself
had sold the show?
Marital Deduction
To the extent that property passing by a
revocable trust may qualify as an "interest
in property passing from the decedent," it
may qualify for the marital deduction. If
the decedent has created an inter-vivos trust
taxable under Section 811(d) with property
which would qualify for the marital deduc-
tion, it must still qualify under Section 812(e)
in order that the deduction may be allowed.
If an interest in property is includible in the
gross estate and if that interest "passes" to
the surviving spouse, the deduction is gen-
erally the value of that interest at the date
of death. If, however, the executor elects to
value the estate under Section 811(j) (one
year after death), the interest in property
qualifying for the marital deduction will
likewise be valued under that section..
Whether an individual is a "surviving
spouse" of the decedent depends upon the
marital status at the time of death. A legal
separation which has not terminated the
marriage does not affect such status. If an
inter-vivos transfer subject to estate tax was
made by the decedent to an individual to
whom he was not then married, the deduc-
tion is nevertheless allowable if they were
married at the time of the decedent's death.
Conversely, if such an inter-vivos transfer
was made to an individual to whom the
decedent was then married, the deduction is
not allowable if they were not married, at
the time of death. This latter result is ap-
parently intended to apply whether the mar-
riage has been terminated by divorce or by
the donee's death.
If, after this condensed treatment of a
relatively narrow area of trusts subject to so
many vagaries, you fear that you are now
in a seemingly advanced state of mental
confusion, you might test yourself as a cer-
tain member of the Chicago bar of some
three score years and ten was recently
tested. He was mentally confused and his
doctor had him in the hospital for treatment.
One day, the two of them were walking
down the corridor, when a particularly at-
tractive nurse passed them. The lawyer
turned, as though he were suddenly coming
out of nowhere, and was heard to exclaim,
"Pretty neat!" At which point, his doctor
commented, "You're cured." [The End]
Liquidating a Shareholder's Interest
in a Closely Held Corporation
By C. IVES WALDO, Jr.
Attorney, Hopkins, Sutter, Halls,
DeWolfe and Owen, Chicago
A SHAREHOLDER in a publicly owned
corporation who desires to dispose of
his shares merely calls his broker and a
sale is promptly effected on a securities ex-
change. Any amount realized in excess of
cost is taxed under Section 117 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code as capital gain.
Disposing of stock in a closely held corpo-
ration, however, is not generally this sim-
ple. There is no established market for such
stock. It will usually not be possible to
find a purchaser outside the existing group
of stockholders. Indeed, it will often be
found that even the other shareholders in
the corporation will not wish to purchase
additional shares, particularly if the deal'
must be financed out of their personal funds.
However, it may happen that the corpora-
tion, despite the restrictions of Code
Section 102, has accumulated surplus, not
required in the conduct of its business, suf-
ficient to purchase the shares desired to be
disposed of. Having the corporation pur-
chase the shares appears at first blush a
happy solution to the problem. Indeed, in
many situations it may be the only feasible
one. At this point, however, Code Sec-
tion 115 (g) rears its ugly head. To the
extent that the corporation has accumu-
lated earnings, the shareholder may find to
his dismay that what he considered to be
a sale was, for tax purposes, not a sale at
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